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HUNTING WITH DRONES: AERIAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE 





 Adoption of small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) technology by U.S. 
law enforcement agencies has entered a period of exponential growth. In 
2016 alone, more law enforcement agencies acquired sUAS than in the pre-
vious five years combined. As of May 2018, at least 910 U.S. public safety 
agencies had acquired sUAS. Despite this rapid growth, no aerial search and 
seizure case in which an sUAS was used has been considered by any appel-
late or state supreme court, or the U.S. Supreme Court. Consequently, dis-
cussion of sUAS search and seizure must be approached from the context of 
existing U.S. Supreme Court decisions related to searches by traditional 
manned aircraft. This Article will discuss existing U.S. Supreme Court aerial 
search and seizure decisions as well as delve into the controversial topic of 
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I. SCOPE OF THE ISSUE 
Unless you have been on a deserted island the last few years, you are 
undoubtedly aware of the controversy surrounding privacy and small un-
manned aircraft systems (sUAS). Many involved in airborne law enforce-
ment feel that the controversy has been generated by the media and does not 
accurately reflect the opinion of the general public.1 The media maintains that 
the public is genuinely concerned about UAS and privacy.2 A study con-
ducted in 2014 by social scientists at the University of North Dakota at-
tempted to gauge the public’s acceptance of sUAS tasked to a variety of mis-
sions.3  Over 600 respondents living in Northeastern North Dakota indicated 
moderate to strong support for law enforcement use of sUAS to search for 
missing persons and crime suspects, photograph crime and traffic accident 
scenes, and conduct disaster assessments.4  Interestingly, commercial pack-
age delivery by sUAS received the lowest level of public support!5   
                                                     
1. Alan Frazier, UAS and Privacy: A Primer, AIR BEAT, July/Aug. 2015, at 46. 
2. Id. 
3. CINDY JUNTUNEN ET AL., COMMUNITY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF UAS IN 
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Over 200 large U.S. law enforcement agencies (employing over 100 
sworn officers) currently utilize manned aircraft.6 In addition, more than fifty 
smaller law enforcement agencies utilize manned aviation assets.7 In almost 
all cases, those manned aircraft are equipped with much more capable sensor 
systems than those installed on sUAS. It is noteworthy that there has not been 
a public outcry regarding invasion of privacy by manned law enforcement 
aircraft. This is likely due to the media, the public, or both misunderstanding 
the capabilities of manned law enforcement aircraft versus sUAS capabilities. 
The public is not well informed regarding the capabilities and limitations of 
sUAS and how and when law enforcement sUAS are utilized. Gregory 
McNeal, a law professor at Pepperdine University, opined:  
Privacy advocates contend that with drones, the government will be 
able to engage in widespread pervasive surveillance because drones 
are cheaper to operate than their manned counterparts. While drones 
are cheaper to operate, the drones most law enforcement agencies 
can afford are currently far less capable than their manned counter-
parts. . . . The surveillance equipment that can be placed on these 
drones is also far less intrusive than that which can be mounted to 
manned aircraft.8 
Hollywood has added to the public’s misunderstanding of sUAS tech-
nology by inaccurately portraying the capabilities of sUAS sensors. Rather 
than a realistic depiction of moderate-resolution (10-20 megapixel) electro-
optical cameras and low-resolution infrared cameras routinely carried by 
sUAS, screenwriters have opted to fictionalize sUAS by depicting them as 
capable of reading an automobile license plate from miles away and being 
able to downlink high-resolution photos capable of processing by facial 
recognition programs. Pursuant to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
regulations, sUAS can only be operated within the “line-of-sight” of the op-
erator.9 This effectively limits the operating radius of sUAS to approximately 
one-half mile. Obtaining a photo with enough resolution to enable facial 
recognition from an sUAS hovering half a mile away from the subject is 
simply not possible with the small electro-optical cameras utilizing digital 
                                                     
6. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 226672, AVIATION UNITS IN LARGE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2007 1 (2009). 
7. Alan Frazier, Revisiting Basics: How to Establish a UAS Unit, AIR BEAT, May/June 2017, 
at 54. 
8. GREGORY MCNEAL, BROOKINGS, DRONES AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGISLATORS 2 (2014). 
9. 14 C.F.R. § 107.31(a) (2018). 
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zoom routinely carried by sUAS.10  In order to get that level of resolution, 
the sUAS could be no more than sixty feet away from the subject.11 At that 
distance, the sUAS would not be covert. 
Small unmanned aircraft systems have been acquired by at least 910  
public safety agencies.12 The majority of these acquisitions have been made 
by state and local law enforcement agencies.13 These sUAS have been used 
to document crime and traffic collision scenes; search for lost persons and 
criminal suspects; maintain perimeters on warrant services; and assess disas-
ter scenes.14 The misconception of sUAS patrolling randomly or hovering to 
peer into a home window is just that—a misconception.15 Most sUAS are 
capable of maximum flight times of no more than thirty minutes.16 This short 
mission duration, combined with the FAA’s regulatory requirement for sUAS 
to remain within the pilot’s unassisted visual line of sight,17 makes random 
patrol flights impractical. The simplistic cameras aboard sUAS, combined 
with the relatively high reflectivity of glass, make peering through closed 
windows with sUAS difficult at best and in many cases impossible (although 
an open window does not pose this barrier). An infrared camera is simply 
unable to “look through glass” as it “sees” the temperature of the glass pane 
and nothing beyond it.18 Surveillance of persons outside of a structure or ve-
hicle is quite a different matter because this type of mission is both techno-
logically feasible and practical using sUAS. These missions bring into play 
Fourth Amendment concepts such as curtilage, open fields, and reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  
 
                                                     
10. Ben Virdee-Chapman, What’s the Effectiveness Range of a Face Recognition Surveillance 
System?, QUORA, https://www.quora.com/Whats-the-effectiveness-range-of-a-face-recognition-
surveillance-system (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
11. Moshe Greenshpan, What’s the Effectiveness Range of a Face Recognition Surveillance 
System?, QUORA, https://www.quora.com/Whats-the-effectiveness-range-of-a-face-recognition-
surveillance-system (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
12. DAN GETTINGER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE AT BARD COLL., PUBLIC SAFETY 
DRONES: AN UPDATE 1 (2018). 
13. Id. 
14. Alan Frazier, Drone Cops: Establishing an Unmanned Aircraft Systems Unit, 67 SHERIFF 
MAG. 12, 12 (2015). 
15. Frazier, supra note 1. 
16. Brent Terwilliger et al., Consumer Multirotor sUAS Evaluation and Rating, 4 INT’L J. 
UNMANNED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 1, 11 (2016). 
17. 14 C.F.R. § 107.31(a) (2018). 
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II. CURTILAGE, OPEN FIELDS, AND REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
In United States v. Dunn,19 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
curtilage. In 1980, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents learned 
that a subject had bought large quantities of chemicals and equipment com-
monly used to manufacture controlled substances.20 The DEA placed track-
ing devices in some of the equipment and chemical containers.21 The tracking 
devices led DEA agents to Dunn’s ranch.22 Aerial photographs of the ranch 
showed the truck backed up to a barn behind the ranch house.23 The ranch 
was completely encircled by a perimeter fence and contained several interior 
barbed-wire fences, including one around the house approximately fifty yards 
from the barn, and a wooden fence enclosing the front of the barn, which had 
an open overhang and locked, waist-high gates.24 Without a warrant, DEA 
agents crossed the perimeter fence, several of the barbed-wire fences, and the 
wooden fence in front of the barn.25 They did not enter the barn but stopped 
at the locked gate and shined a flashlight inside, observing what they believed 
to be a drug laboratory.26 They then left the ranch but entered it twice the next 
day to confirm the laboratory’s presence.27 They obtained a search warrant 
and executed it, arresting Dunn and seizing chemicals and equipment as well 
as amphetamines they discovered in Dunn’s house.28 After the district court 
denied Dunn’s motion to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, 
Dunn and the truck driver were convicted of conspiracy to manufacture con-
trolled substances and related offenses.29 But the court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the barn was within the residence’s curtilage and therefore 
within the Fourth Amendment’s protection.30 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari 
to decide whether the area near a barn, located approximately fifty yards from 
                                                     
19. 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
20. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 296. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 297. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 297. 
26. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 298. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 298-99. 
29. Id. at 299. 
30. United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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a fence surrounding a ranch house, was within the curtilage of the house.31 In 
writing for the majority, Justice White concluded that the barn and the area 
around it lay outside the curtilage of the house, and accordingly reversed the 
judgment of the court of appeals.32 In his opinion, Justice White wrote:  
Drawing upon the Court’s own cases and the cumulative experience 
of the lower courts that have grappled with the task of defining the 
extent of a home’s curtilage, we believe that curtilage questions 
should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the 
proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether 
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the 
nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.33 
The U.S. Supreme Court dealt with the legal concept of “open fields” in 
the 1924 case of Hester v. United States.34 Hester was charged and convicted 
of possessing illegal liquor.35 The case was accepted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court after a district court’s ruling that the testimony of two revenue officers 
related to observations they made while on Hester’s father’s land was admis-
sible. In writing for the majority, Justice Holmes stated: 
The case is brought here directly from the District Court on the sin-
gle ground that by refusing to exclude the testimony of two wit-
nesses and to direct a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff in error, 
the Court violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments of the Constitution of the United States. 
The witnesses whose testimony is objected to were revenue officers. 
In consequence of information they went toward the house of Hes-
ter’s father, where the plaintiff in error lived, and as they approached 
saw one Henderson drive near to the house. They concealed them-
selves from fifty to one hundred yards away and saw Hester come 
out and hand Henderson a quart bottle. An alarm was given. Hester 
went to a car standing near, took a gallon jug from it and he and 
Henderson ran. One of the officers pursued, and fired a pistol. Hes-
ter dropped his jug, which broke but kept about a quart of its con-
tents. Henderson threw away his bottle also. The jug and bottle both 
contained what the officers, being experts, recognized as moonshine 
                                                     
31. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 301. 
34. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
35. Hester, 265 U.S. at 57. 
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whisky, that is, whisky illicitly distilled; said to be easily recogniza-
ble. The other officer entered the house, but being told there was no 
whisky there left it, but found outside a jar that had been thrown out 
and broken and that also contained whisky. While the officers were 
there other cars stopped at the house but were spoken to by Hester’s 
father and drove off. The officers had no warrant for search or arrest, 
and it is contended that this made their evidence inadmissible, it be-
ing assumed, on the strength of the pursuing officer’s saying that he 
supposed they were on Hester’s land, that such was the fact. It is 
obvious that even if there had been a trespass, the above testimony 
was not obtained by an illegal search or seizure. The defendant’s 
own acts, and those of his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and 
the bottle—and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when 
the officers examined the contents of each after it had been aban-
doned. This evidence was not obtained by the entry into the house 
and it is immaterial to discuss that. The suggestion that the defend-
ant was compelled to give evidence against himself does not require 
an answer. The only shadow of a ground for bringing up the case is 
drawn from the hypothesis that the examination of the vessels took 
place upon Hester’s father’s land. As to that, it is enough to say that, 
apart from the justification, the special protection accorded by the 
Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers 
and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields. The distinction be-
tween the latter and the house is as old as the common law.36 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
in Katz v. United States.37 Charles Katz utilized a telephone located within 
an outdoor public phone booth in Los Angeles to facilitate bookmaking in 
Miami and Boston.38 Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents used an elec-
tronic eavesdropping device attached to the phone booth to record Katz’s 
conversations.39 The recordings were entered as evidence in Katz’s trial, dur-
ing which he was convicted of transmitting wagering information by tele-
phone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084.40 Katz appealed, 
                                                     
36. Id. at 57-59. 
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 348 n.1. 
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maintaining that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the eaves-
dropping search.41 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Katz.42 Justice Stew-
art wrote the majority opinion.43 It is Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, 
however, that is most often cited. Justice Harlan built upon the foundations 
of the majority opinion and formulated the “reasonable expectation test” for 
determining whether government activity constitutes a search.44 Later, this 
test was arranged into a two-prong test for determining the existence of pri-
vacy: If (1) the individual has demonstrated a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively 
reasonable, then there is a right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.45 
III. AERIAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Beyond the oft-debated concepts of curtilage, open fields, and reasona-
ble expectation of privacy, it is vital that the Fourth Amendment as applied 
to aerial search and seizure be addressed. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is likely mem-
orized (or at least remembered in paraphrase) by every law enforcement of-
ficer, prosecutor, and criminal defense attorney:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.46  
As John Villasenor eloquently stated: 
[A] careful examination of Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence 
suggests that the Constitution will provide a much stronger measure 
of protection against government UAS privacy abuses than is 
widely appreciated. The Fourth Amendment has served us well 
since its ratification in 1791, and there is no reason to suspect it will 
                                                     
41. Id. at 348-49. 
42. Id. at 359. 
43. Id. at 348. 
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
45. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
3, 20 (2007). 
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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be unable to do so in a world where unmanned aircraft are widely 
used.47  
While the Fourth Amendment is unarguably the touchstone of all search 
and seizure cases, the “devil is in the details.” Although the Supreme Court 
has never explicitly considered the question of sUAS privacy, there is a long 
list of relevant precedent.48 United States Supreme Court cases related to aer-
ial search and seizure, as well as pertinent associated technology, include 
United States v. Causby;49 Kyllo v. United States;50 California v. Ciraolo;51 
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States;52 Florida v. Riley;53 and United States 
v. Jones.54 A brief synopsis of these cases follows. 
In United States v. Causby, the Court considered whether a government 
plane flying over Causby’s property at eighty-three feet above ground level, 
allegedly causing the death Causby’s chickens, gave him the right to seek 
compensation for the value of the dead chickens from the government.55 The 
Court ruled in Causby’s favor, remanding the case back to the trial court.56 
This case has been characterized (incorrectly in the author’s opinion) in some 
quarters as stating that property owners “own” the airspace above their prop-
erty to at least eighty-three feet.57 Consequently, entry into this airspace could 
infringe upon property rights, create a trespass, and potentially trigger rea-
sonable expectation of privacy issues related to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion against unreasonable search and seizure. The author rejects this interpre-
tation and suggests that Causby represents a Fifth Amendment “taking” case, 
which supports the concept that a property owner has a right to due process 
prior to the government conducting an activity near his property that could 
reasonably be determined to cause that property owner a monetary loss.58  
Although not an aerial search case, Kyllo v. United States dealt with in-
frared sensor searches.59 Since infrared sensors are commonly carried by law 
                                                     
47. John Villasenor, Observations From Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 461 (2013). 
48. Id. at 475. 
49. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
50. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
51. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
52. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
53. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
54. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
55. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258-59 (1946). 
56. Id. at 268. 
57. Id. at 263-64. 
58. Id. at 266. 
59. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
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enforcement sUAS, Kyllo is pertinent to this discussion. In 1991, suspecting 
that Kyllo was operating an indoor marijuana growing operation in one unit 
of a Florence, Oregon, residential triplex, agents with the U.S. Department 
of Interior used a handheld infrared sensor to scan the exterior of Kyllo’s 
residence.60 The agents detected a heat pattern that was inconsistent with the 
other two units in the triplex and consistent with an indoor marijuana growing 
operation.61 Using this information, as well as informant statements and in-
formation on power usage obtained from the local electric utility company, 
the agents requested and received a search warrant.62 Service of the warrant 
resulted in the seizure of over 100 marijuana plants and Kyllo’s arrest. During 
trial, Kyllo attempted to suppress the infrared search on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.63 The trial court rejected the suppression motion and was subse-
quently affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.64 The 
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and found that the use 
of an infrared sensor to view a residential dwelling was a “search” and in that 
particular instance, unreasonable.65  
California v. Ciraolo concerned a marijuana cultivation case occurring 
in Santa Clara, California.66 Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip 
that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his residential backyard.67 The offic-
ers went to the location and attempted to make observations from a public 
sidewalk but were thwarted by two, tall fences surrounding the property.68 
The officers subsequently flew over the property at 1000 feet above ground 
level in a private airplane.69 They observed marijuana plants growing in Ci-
raolo’s backyard.70 They leveraged that observation to obtain a search war-
rant.71 The warrant was subsequently executed, marijuana plants were seized, 
and Ciraolo was arrested.72 Ciraolo attempted to suppress the aerial search, 
alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.73 The case traveled a circuitous path 
                                                     
60. Id. at 29-30. 
61. Id. at 29. 
62. Id. at 30. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 30-31. 
65. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
66. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1986). 





72. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209-10. 
73. Id. at 210. 
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to the U.S. Supreme Court, which found the search to be reasonable.74 In the 
majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated: 
The observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took 
place within public navigable airspace, in a physically nonintrusive 
manner; from this point they were able to observe plants readily dis-
cernible to the naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from 
aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were 
trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. Such observation is pre-
cisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant. 
Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down 
could have seen everything that these officers observed.75 
Although it is not a criminal case, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States 
speaks to the constitutionality of aerial observation.76 In 1978, the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) was investigating allegations of ex-
cessive emissions from generators located at a Dow Chemical plant in Mid-
land, Michigan.77 Dow Chemical denied EPA entry to the facility.78 In 
response, EPA contracted with a private company to conduct an unan-
nounced aerial inspection.79 Aerial photos were taken from 1200, 3000, and 
12,000 feet.80 When Dow learned that EPA had taken aerial photographs of 
its facilities, it filed suit in district court alleging that EPA had conducted a 
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.81 The district court 
ruled that the aerial inspection violated Dow’s “expectation of privacy” from 
searches.82 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed 
the ruling on the grounds that Dow only enjoyed a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the interior of the facility.83 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the  
Sixth Circuit’s decision, finding the aerial search to be constitutional.84 
                                                     
74. Id. at 215. 
75. Id. at 213-14. 





81. Id. at 230. 
82. Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 230. 
83. Id. at 230-31. 
84. Id. at 239. 
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In Florida v. Riley, Pasco County, Florida, Sheriff’s Deputies received a 
tip that Riley was cultivating marijuana on his property.85 Orbiting the prop-
erty in a helicopter at 400 feet above ground level, the deputies were able to 
see through missing panels in the roof of a greenhouse and observed mariju-
ana growing.86 A search warrant was obtained and executed.87 Marijuana was 
seized, and Riley was arrested.88 Riley filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained in the search.89 The trial court granted his motion and held that view-
ing his property from the air violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.90 The Florida appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and de-
nied Riley’s motion to dismiss the evidence.91 The appellate court also 
certified the case to the Supreme Court of Florida, which reinstated the trial 
court’s order to suppress the evidence.92 The State of Florida filed for and 
was granted certiorari.93 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the trial 
court and the Supreme Court of Florida, finding the aerial search to be con-
stitutional.94 Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated that “what was 
growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air. . . . Any 
member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley’s property in 
a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s green-
house. The police officer did no more.”95 
And finally, United States v. Jones, decided in 2012, involved task force 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation and Washington, DC Metropolitan Police) 
officers placing a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device on An-
toine Jones’s vehicle in 2005.96 Jones was a suspect in a narcotics investiga-
tion.97 The tracking device remained on Jones’s vehicle for approximately 
one month and provided evidence of Jones being at a location where illicit 
narcotics sales occurred.98 After two trials, one ending in a mistrial, Jones 
                                                     
85. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 448-49. 
88. Id. at 449. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449. 
92. Id. at 447-49. 
93. Id. at 447. 
94. Id. at 452. 
95. Id. at 451. 
96. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402-03 (2012). 
97. Id. at 402. 
98. Id. at 403. 
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and a co-conspirator were convicted of conspiring to sell drugs.99 Jones ap-
pealed, and his conviction was overturned.100 The Supreme Court granted the 
U.S. Government’s petition for certiorari.101 The Court was unanimous in its 
finding that the task force’s actions were unconstitutional.102 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, cited a Fourth Amendment violation in the form of 
a trespass when the GPS device was installed.103 Justice Alito, in a concurring 
opinion, differed from the majority, reasoning that the method of evidence 
collection was unconstitutional.104 Justice Alito stated that Jones’s “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy” was violated by the “long-term” (four weeks) 
monitoring.105 Jones demonstrates that the duration of surveillance is a rele-
vant factor for Fourth Amendment inquiries. The longer the technology is 
used to support a surveillance, the more intrusive the search becomes. 
Collectively, an analysis of the cited cases provides insight into factors 
that the Supreme Court deems important in the areas of aerial searches and 
the use of technology when conducting aerial searches: 
(1) Was the law enforcement aircraft in “navigable airspace,” and 
could a civilian aircraft have made an observation from that 
same position? 
(2) Did the law enforcement aircraft create any disruptive noise or 
rotor downwash? 
(3) What was the duration of the search? 
(4) Did the defendant take any effort to conceal the subject area 
from aerial search? 
(5) Was the technology used to intrude on the interior of a dwell-
ing? 
(6) Was the technology used readily available to the public?  
Terms such as “navigable airspace” have been complicated106 by the 
FAA’s insistence that sUAS remain below 400 feet.107 Prior to the beginning 
of widespread use of sUAS, navigable airspace was generally described in 
                                                     
99. Id. at 403-04. 
100. Id. at 404. 
101. Id. 
102. Jones, 565 U.S. at 413. 
103. Id. at 405. 
104. Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring). 
105. Id. at 429-31. 
106. Villasenor, supra note 47, at 490. 
107. 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(b) (2018). 
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terms of minimum safe altitudes for manned aircraft pursuant to 14 C.F.R. 
Part 91. Fixed-wing aircraft are generally not able to fly lower than 500 feet 
above ground level unless landing or taking off.108 Helicopters cannot fly 
lower than an altitude that, when presented with an engine failure, would al-
low a landing without undue risk to persons or property on the surface.109 
The paradigm of “minimum safe altitudes” is inverted with sUAS, as the 
FAA imposes a “maximum safe altitude” of 400 feet.110 This mandate, com-
bined with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riley that observations made 
by law enforcement officers from a helicopter at 400 feet were constitutional, 
gives rise to an interesting predicament: absent a warrant, observations from 
an sUAS quadcopter below 400 feet potentially run afoul of Riley. And ob-
servations from an sUAS above 400 feet are not legally possible due to the 
altitude restriction imposed by FAA regulations.111 Considering the increas-
ing use of sUAS by law enforcement, further clarification from the Supreme 
Court is desirable. As criminal cases in which law enforcement use sUAS 
make their way through the courts, we will likely see a case make it to a 
federal appellate court, or even the U.S. Supreme Court, in the relatively near 
future.  
In addition to the Fourth Amendment and relevant U.S. Supreme Court 
cases, law enforcement operators of sUAS must be aware of, and comply 
with, applicable state laws. In 2016, Jonathon Hauenschild stated, “there are 
over 750 introduced or enacted laws [in the U.S.]  where ‘autonomous aerial 
system,’ ‘autonomous aerial vehicle,’ or ‘drone’ are mentioned in the text. A 
number of these proposed laws impact law enforcement’s use of UAS/UAV 
technology. . . .”112  The North Dakota Century Code contains one such 
law.113 The North Dakota statute is focused on law enforcement use of sUAS 
for “surveillance purposes.”114 Perplexingly, though, the statute’s rather 
skimpy definitions section fails to define “surveillance.”115 Consequently, 
what constitutes surveillance is unknown. The statute provides that “Infor-
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mation obtained from an unmanned aerial vehicle is not admissible in a pros-
ecution or proceeding within the state unless the information was obtained: 
(a) [p]ursuant to the authority of a search warrant; or (b) [i]n accordance with 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.”116 Subsection (b) is quite important 
in that it codifies exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Presumably 
the legislature was referring to consent;117 search incident to lawful arrest;118 
plain view;119 stop and frisk;120 automobiles;121 hot pursuit;122 and exigent 
circumstances.123 The Grand Forks County Sheriff’s Department—one of the 
few law enforcement agencies in North Dakota utilizing sUAS—has com-
plied with this law by requiring officers to obtain a warrant for all sUAS 
evidence-gathering flights that are not conducted subject to recognized 
Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions.124 In reality, the Northeast Region 
sUAS Unit has conducted over 100 missions since the statute’s enactment. 
None of those missions required a search warrant because they all met one or 
more of the seven recognized warrant exceptions, most commonly “plain 
view.”125  
IV. WEAPONIZATION OF SUAS 
Despite the media’s occasional preoccupation with the possibility of law 
enforcement agencies arming sUAS,126 there are no U.S. law enforcement 
agencies currently doing so. Many law enforcement agencies, including the 
Grand Forks County Sheriff’s Office (GFSO), have a policy prohibiting the 
arming of sUAS.127 The GFSO Northeast Region Unit’s UAS Policies and 
Procedures Manual states: “Deployment of any type of projectile, chemical 
agent, or electrical current weapon from a Unit UAS is PROHIBITED.”128 
National law enforcement organizations have taken the position that arming 
sUAS is inappropriate. For example, the International Association of Chiefs 
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of Police “discourages” the arming of sUAS.129 The Public Safety Aviation 
Accreditation Commission also includes an arms prohibition in their recently 
published guidelines on sUAS programs.130 
Use of force is one of the most important decisions made by law enforce-
ment officers. It has potential criminal, civil, and societal repercussions. 
Making the decision to use force based on viewing an sUAS video, which 
may be poor quality and subject to a few seconds latency, is not wise. While 
the delivery of both lethal and less-than-lethal force from sUAS is technolog-
ically possible, the potential repercussions of using force through sUAS make 
it undesirable. In addition, sufficient means of deploying reasonable force 
already exist absent the use of sUAS as a delivery platform.131  
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
While discussing the Fourth Amendment and case law applicable to law 
enforcement’s use of sUAS is quite interesting, no comment on the subject 
would be complete without providing suggestions on how law enforcement 
can responsibly and legally implement the technology. 
A. ENGAGE AND EDUCATE THE PUBLIC 
Attempting to keep consideration or creation of an sUAS unit from the 
public is simply a bad decision. On the contrary, law enforcement agencies 
should engage the public as much as possible. One way to do so is to utilize 
existing police advisory panels and community groups to weigh in on the use 
of sUAS. Consider input received from these groups to help formulate sUAS 
unit policies and procedures. Schedule and widely advertise forums to solicit 
input from the public. Reach out to organizations such as service clubs, cham-
bers of commerce, and neighborhood watch groups. Provide these groups’ 
members with factual information on when and how sUAS will be utilized. 
Be welcoming and transparent to the media. Invite local media representa-
tives to observe sUAS unit training sessions. Answer questions directly and 
honestly. Only through this type of earnest dialog can law enforcement agen-
cies gauge the public’s opinion of sUAS and dispel the incorrect perceptions 
of sUAS which, to a great extent, have been fostered by the media.132 
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B. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
Agencies should include unequivocal language in their sUAS policies 
and procedures emphasizing the importance of respecting the Constitution 
and the privacy of the public. For example, the GFSO Northeast UAS Unit’s 
Mission Statement ends with “Missions will be accomplished efficiently and 
safely while respecting the law and the privacy of the citizens we serve.”133 
Specific guidance on when a search warrant is required should be included 
in the policy. Guidelines and procedures for minimization of camera usage 
and storage of images are essential. Digital images obtained from sUAS 
should be safeguarded as evidence in compliance with the agency’s evidence 
policy.134   
C. INITIAL AND RECURRENT TRAINING 
All sUAS unit personnel should receive initial training on aerial search 
and seizure statutes and case law as well as unit and department policies and 
procedures related to searches and seizures of evidence. Emphasis should be 
placed on minimizing the gathering of images and safeguarding those im-
ages. Document all training thoroughly and accurately. If it is not docu-
mented, it did not occur. Supervisors and managers should provide adequate 
oversight to ensure that sUAS unit policies and procedures are being properly 
implemented.135  
D. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 
As in the case of any alleged serious violation of an agency policy, agen-
cies should accept and vigorously investigate any allegations of inappropriate 
use of sUAS. If the allegation is sustained, appropriate action should be ini-
tiated up to and including transfer from the unit or termination of employ-
ment.136   
E. COORDINATION WITH PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 
An outreach effort to engage and coordinate with prosecutors and judges 
should be initiated. Open dialog between law enforcement and these officers 
of the court will foster a mutual understanding of sUAS technology and the 
underlying legal principles that must be adhered to in its use.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement has become a complex undertaking. Each time a new 
technology is added, complexity increases. In order to ensure that law en-
forcement agencies are not only “doing things right,” but more importantly, 
are “doing the right thing,” they must carefully consider each new technology 
that is implemented. Small unmanned aircraft systems are just one of the re-
cent technologies that law enforcement must carefully consider and respon-
sibly implement.137 Law enforcement agencies utilizing sUAS should estab-
lish policies specifically related to appropriate use of the technology, 
including when a search warrant is required and how digital evidence will be 
safeguarded and stored. Law enforcement agencies should strongly consider 
prohibiting delivery of force from sUAS.  
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